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on the business needs and whether the cycle computation adequately
provides for those needs.

The variations and refinements suggested

above 2215 attempt to illustrate such "facts," but by no means do they
exhaust the field. The more sophisticated a taxpayer and his records,
the better able he will be to take advantage of these variations and re-

finements and thus possibly present a more detailed and realisio analysis
than the Bardahlcase originally required. 226 In addition to the uniform

application of the cycle computation by the courts, the courts have also
tended to apply a uniform definition of "working capital" except in a
few cases. However, as discussed earlier, working capital for accounting purposes is not necessarily identical to working capital in relation
to the ability to pay dividends. 227

It would be advantageous for a tax-

payer to point out this distinction to the court.
WILLiAM L. TuKERsLEY
MARGARET G. JOHNSTON

The Federal-Aid Highway Construction Process:
Procedures, Cases, and Plaintiff Strategies
The demand for modem highways has risen sharply. To meet this

surging need, Congress in 1956 enacted the Federal-Aid Highway Act.1
In so doing the nation embarked upon a massive twenty-year program

to construct an interstate highway system linking the major uxban areas
from coast to coast. 2 A formidable procedure was established to ad225. See Parts H-IV supra.
226. An analysis of working capital needs which is too complicated or sophisticated
might confuse the court and as a result hurt the proponent of such an analysis. See
Batteistein Inv. Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
227. See Part V supra.
1. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374.
2. The following description of the federal-aid highway program expresses its
magnitude and effect:
The pavement area of the system, assembled in one huge parking lot,
would be 20 miles square and could accommodate two-thirds of all motor vehicles in the United States. New right-of-way needed amounts to 1% million
acres. Total excavations will move enough material to bury Connecticut kneedeep in dirt. Sand, gravel, and crushed stone for the construction would build
a wall 50 feet wide and 9 feet high completely around the world. The concrete
used would build six sidewalks to the moon; the tar and asphalt would build
driveways for 35 million homes. The steel will take 30 million tons of iron
ore, 18 million tons of coal, and 6 million tons of limestone. Lumber and
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minister the complex scheme by which the federal government reim-

burses the states for highway planning and construction. Although
this important process was initially closed to effective public participation, recently issued regulations, new federal statutes, and renewed public interest have opened the federal-aid highway program to public
scrutiny.
The wisdom of building roads merely because substantial federal

funding is available has recently come under strong attack.3 Now that
the social and environmental effects of large-scale highway building
are becoming known, more citizens are becoming involved in the planning process.4 This comment will discuss: (1) the development of
federal highway legislation; (2) the procedural requirements of the federal interstate highway program, including the current case law involving significant challenges to that process; and (3) the problems and
potential strategies available to advocate groups in future litigation.
timber requirements would take all the trees from a 400-square-mile forest.
Enough culvert and drain pipe is needed to equal the combined water and
sewer systems in six cities the size of Chicago.
BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA'S LIFELINES:

FEDERAL

Am FOR IGHWAYS 11 (1962), quoted in G. SMERK, URBAN TRANSPORTATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE 131 (1965).
3. The prevalent assumption that highways and privately owned automobiles present the best system for future transit needs has been severely criticized by planners.
John E. Hirten, Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, has
stated,
What's needed is a "new perception of transportation" which will place
goals and objectives for mobility in their proper perspective. The need and
desire for mobility and economic benefits as one value must be weighed against
the value inherent in social, environmental, ecological, and energy considerations. In order to weigh all these factors in the decisionmaking process, a new
approach must be taken in planning and developing transportation facilities
and solutions.
Hirten, Needed-A New Perception in Transportation, 39 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 278
(1973). See also T. STONE, BEYOND THE AUTOMOBILE: RESHAPING THE TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT (1971).
The anti-freeway revolt is well documented in magazine
and newspaper articles. See Aman, Urban Highways: The Problems of Route Location
and a Proposed Solution, 47 J. URBAN L. 817, 817 n.1 (1970).
4. A public opinion survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation of
Princeton, New Jersey revealed several illuminating findings about highways: (1) the
public is poorly informed on the subject of highway financing because only one in four
persons knows that federal-aid highways are mainly funded by the tax on gasoline; (2)
57% endorse the idea of limiting the use of cars in the downtown areas of cities; (3)
62% choose the automobile, and 33% select public transit for their most frequent trips;
(4) 80% characterize their opinion of the U.S. highway system as very favorable or
fairly favorable; (5) people have a poor idea of how much each driver pays for federalaid highways each year; and (6) there is an even division on the question of whether
highways have a positive or negative effect on the environment. Hearings on S. 3589
& S. 3590 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-H37, at 682 (1972).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY-PROGRAM

The framers of the Constitution recognized the need for a coordinated and efficient transportation system. Their interest was to preserve the free flow of the mails between the states and to normalize
communications during the post-Revolutionary War period. They empowered Congress "to establish Post Offices and post Roads." 5 Although overland travel was difficult, the goal of free interstate movement was clearly acknowledged. Throughout the Nineteenth Century
the federal government also aided the transcontinental railroads in a
quest to provide rapid and inexpensive transit for the developing western lands. 0
The involvement of the federal government in roadbuilding began in 1916 when Congress established the Bureau of Roads within
the Department of Agriculture to assist in the construction of rural post
roads. 7 This legislation set up the reimbursement framework which
remains intact in the federal-aid highway system today. The federal
government, through the Department of Agriculture, would refund
state expenditures for the planning and construction of approved highways as long as the completed roadway met established federal standards.' Under the 1916 legislation, state highway departments submitted projects of "substantial character" for federal approval, after
which up to fifty percent of the project cost could be returned to the
state.' The states were under an obligation to maintain the federal-aid
An
highways' 9 and to refrain from charging tolls for their use."
amendment in 1921 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to give preferential treatment to interstate highways.' 2 This directive foreshadowed
the ultimate federal emphasis on the interstate system.
By 1944 the program had been considerably expanded. Con5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
6. See generally C. GOoDRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS
AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890, at 268-71 (1960); R. HuNr, LAW AND LOCOMOTIvS 87-88
(1958); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGuLATION 1877-1916, at 15 (1965).
7. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355.
8. Id. at 357.
9. Id. Congress initially appropriated five million dollars for the program in
1916. Id. at 356. In addition, the allowable reimbursement was limited to ten thousand
dollars per mile. Id. at 358. This stands in stark contrast to modem roadbuilding costs.
10. Id. at 358.
11. Id. at 356. This provision has been continued and is codified in 23 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1970).
12. "That in approving projects to receive Federal aid under the provisions of this
Act the Secretary of Agriculture shall give prefeience to such projects as will expedite
the completion of an adequate and connected system of highways, interstate in character." Act of Nov. 9, 1921, ch. 119, § 6, 42 Stat. 212.
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gress appropriated one and one-half billion dollars for highway construction during a three-year post-war period."3 Emphasis was turned
to the creation of a forty thousand mile highway system linking the
major urban areas in the nation.14 In 1956 Congress passed new federal highway aid legislation which was intended to implement the 1916
act and all subsequent amendments.15 This bill committed substantial federal funds to the nation's highways and increased the federal
reimbursement to ninety percent.1" Again the completion of the interstate highway system became the goal of the program, but this time
it was to be financed through the Highway Trust Fund.17
The final administrative change in the federal roadbuilding effort

occurred in 1966 when the Department of Transportation was formed.18
This newly created agency was established to coordinate the develop-

ment of all types or transportation, 9 and the Federal Highway Administrator was brought within its organizational structure.20
II.

PROCEDURE

The federal interstate highway system presents the observer
with a peculiar picture of administrative cooperation. The highways
are planned, engineered, constructed, and maintained by the states but
financed primarily by the federal government. An elaborate procedure
has grown up around the system by which the individual state highway
agencies obtain reimbursement for highway building activities. This
process entails communication in two directions: application from the
states to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and response
from the federal agency back to the states. The actors in this system
13. Act of Dec. 20, 1944, ch. 626, 58 Stat. 838.
14. Id. at 842. This figure has been increased to 42,500 miles. 23 U.S.C.
§ 103(e) (3) (1970). In addition, the time estimate for the completion of the interstate
system was originally set at sixteen years (1956-1972). Now most observers project
completion sometime after 1980.
15. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374.
16. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) (1970).
17. Id. § 101(b) states that "it is hereby declared that the prompt and early completion of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways . . . is essential to
the national interest and is one of the most important objectives of this Act." Section
105(c) of that title further provides for preference to be given to projects of an interstate character. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, tit. 11, § 209, 70 Stat. 397, created the
Highway Trust Fund to be sustained by taxes on road users. The best known of these
taxes is the four cents per gallon tax on gasoline sales. Other sources of revenue are
taxes on rubber tubes and tires, heavy vehicles, automobiles parts and accessories, and
a manufacturers tax on trucks, buses, and trailers.
18. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931.
19. Id. at 933.
20. Id. at 932.
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The states are represented by officials in their

respective highway departments. The federal government, on the other
hand, delegates administrative power through an extensive pyramid of

agents. Atop this structure is the Secretary of the Department of Transportation who vests the Federal Highway Administrator with the power

to oversee the federal-aid program. Subordinate to the Federal Highway Administrator are twelve regional officers who seek to insure uniform practices by the state highway departments. Finally, there is one
division office located in each state, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. 21 The function of supervising state action and enforcing

compliance with federal statutes, regulations, and memoranda is exercised by the division offices.

The division engineer is the principal

FHWA representative in each state, and consequently most routine decisionmaking is done by him.22 There is a further subdivision of federal presence into districts and their component areas. The similarity
of professional outlook and the close working relationship between the
division engineer and state highway department officials has prompted

criticism from those who opposed unbridled highway construction. It
is argued that important decisions bearing on environmental and social

considerations have been made by isolated administrators working

with preconceived notions of what is best for the public.2 3 Further-

more, when these decisions are litigated, there is often much confusion
about the exact requirements of federal law. Judges have been far
from uniform in their interpretation of the federal statutes and regulations which prescribe the procedural and substantive requirements of
the federal-aid highway construction process. 24 Judicial misinterpre-

tation of the statutory mandates is often caused by unknowledgeable
counsel who fail adequately to understand and brief the more general
21. 26 Fed. Reg. 12536-39 (1961).
22. FHWA Administrative Memorandum 1-10.2 (Aug. 21, 1969). Federal Highway Administrator Francis C. Turner stated that of the 5,515 Federal-aid highway project approvals made in the first half of 1970, only 154 required Washington office action.
Ninety-seven percent of the decisions are made in division offices. Red Tape-Inquiring
into Delays and Excessive Paperwork in Administration of Public Works Programs Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public
Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Red Tape].
23. Besides the lack of restraints on the discretion of highway officials, institutional self-interest threatens a balanced transportation policy. Tabor R. Stone writes,
"This resistance [to alternative transportation modes] is reinforced by that of various
state highway departments, whose personnel see their livelihood threatened by any systematic movement that would discourage the continuous production and maintenance of
an extensive highway network." T. STONE, supra note 3, at 122.
24. Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administrative Procedures and ludicial Interpretation,2 ENv. L. REP. 50001, 50017-18 (1972).
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procedural framework for their cases. Fortunately, there has been a
substantial amount of highway construction litigation in recent years
which has clarified the legal duties of both state and federal officials
under federal highway statutes and regulations.
The following narrative describes the procedure by which states
are partially reimbursed for planning and constructing roads that are
part of the interstate highway system. To simplify matters, the federalaid highway program can be viewed in five progressive stages: (1)
program approval; (2) route location approval; (3) design approval;
(4) plans, specification and estimate approval; and (5) construction
approval. Each step in this process is preceded by various state and
federal actions which are required by federal statute, administrative
regulation, and FHWA memoranda.2 5 Federal repayment for completed work accrues only when the specified prerequisites are met.
A.

ProgramApproval

When Congress authorizes funds for federal-aid highway projects,
the Federal Highway Administrator must apportion these monies to the
states according to a predetermined formula.20 After a state's share
has been determined, it is further divided for use in each category of
the federal-aid highway program in that state.21 The state itself decides which particular projects will be proposed for reimbursement.
From its own studies measuring present road capacity and future highway demand, the state highway department will establish developmental priorities for road systems. A program of proposed projects is
then drawn up which lists every project for which funding will be requested. This program must be submitted to the FHWA for an ap28
proval which serves as a condition precedent to future reimbursement.
25. Many federal requirements appear as directives, memoranda, or regulations.
Properly promulgated regulations undoubtedly carry with them the force of law. Directives and memoranda present problems for litigators. Id. at 50001-02 n.7. The authority to make policies and procedures is delegated to the Federal Highway Administrator,
but 23 C.F.R. § 1.32(a) (1973) specifically declares that such action does not carry
with it the legal effect of a regulation. The Comptroller General, on the other hand,
has ruled that these policies and procedures do have legal status, 43 Comp. GEN. 31
(1964). The precise legal authority of the various memoranda issued by the Federal
Highway Administrator remains unsettled.
26. 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). The discussion of this process in Peterson & Kennan,
supra note 24, at 50003-06, is especially illuminating.
27. This means that the state highway department will know the amount it has
to spend on its federally supported primary, secondary, and interstate systems.
28. 23 U.S.C. § 103(f) (1970); FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 201, para. 2(a) (April 15, 1958).
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Prior to this administrative action, several prerequisites must be fulfilled.
First, in urban areas with a population of more than fifty thousand, each project must be shown to be part of a "continuing comprehensive transportation planning process." 9 This requirement, added
in 1962, seeks to encourage the application of long range planning
principles to transportation programs. In D.C. Federation of Civic
Associations v. Volpe"0 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Secretary, in making this determination, must not rely
solely on a single, existing plan but must consider the continuous com31
prehensive planning process for the area in question.
Second, the state has the duty to coordinate its highway planning
activities with its designated A-95 review clearinghouse to assure that
notice of each project will be circulated to all interested agencies.3 2
Third, it must be determined whether the proposed projects entail
work on highways located on the federal-aid system.33 If a road is not
presently situated on ,the federal-aid system, application must be made
to the FHWA to establish that designation.3 4 The question of what
constitutes a federal-aid highway is frequently litigated. Although a
road is approved as part of the state's program and located on the
federal-aid system, it may fail to become a federal-aid project governed
by federal law. Highways constructed entirely with state funds and
under the exclusive supervision of state officials are clearly exempt from
most of the federal highway construction regulations.3 5 However, partial federal funding of a highway construction project subjects it to all
of the legal requirements of a federal-aid highway. The major question before the courts is when in the highway building process are
federal requirements applicable. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe3" the
court stated that a highway project becomes part of the federal-aid high29. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1970).
30. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
31. Id. at 1239-40.
32. Office of Budget and Management, Circular A-95, reprinted in HousiNG &
DEv.REP. 110:0701 (1974).
33. The federal statute prohibits program approval of any project not on the federal-aid system. 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970) specifically states that "the Secretary may
approve a program inwhole or inpart, but he shall not approve any project in a proposed program which is not located upon an approved Federal-aid system."
34. 23 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1973). See also FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum
10-1 (May 28, 1965).
35. Civic Improvement Comm'n v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
36. 337 F.Supp. 221 (N.D.Cal. 1971).
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way system upon location approval and that the various statutes and
regulations apply after that time even though a state subsequently
does not request actual federal funding.
The Fifth Circuit in Named
Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas
Highway Department38 took a similar approach. It stated that a highway became a federal project when the Secretary of Transportation
authorized federal participation. The court concluded that the highway would remain subject to federal standards even if the state undertook the entire funding of the project." Thus some courts have found
the applicability of federal highway requirements to depend not upon
federal funding but upon state action which initiates the federal-aid
highway process.
Fourth, the state highway department must provide assurances to
the FHWA that "employment in connection with proposed projects will
be provided without regard to race, color, creed or national origin."40
This requirement is easy to satisfy on paper but difficult to police in
the field.
Fifth, highway projects which propose to use public parklands
or historic sites must be justified on two grounds. It is necessary to
show that there exists "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the use
of the land and that the project will be planned to minimize the harm
resulting from the use. 4 1 This requirement establishes, as a national
policy, the preservation of these lands.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 42 the Supreme
Court concluded that if an interstate highway were to be built through
Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee, the Secretary must first determine that, as a matter of sound engineering, it would not be feasible to
37. Id. at 227.
38. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. Id. at 1027.
40. 23 U.S.C. § 140(a) (1970). Furthermore, if it is considered necessary, the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation may
require certification by any State desiring to avail itself of the benefits of this
chapter that there are in existence and available on a regional, statewide, or
local basis, apprenticeship, skill improvement or other upgrading programs, registered with the Department of Labor or the appropriate State agency, if any,
which provide equal opportunity without regard to race, color, creed or national origin.
Id.
41. Id. § 138. This section was added in 1968 to make the wording in title 23
identical to that of section 1653(f) in title 49. Title 49 governs all programs and projects subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transporation.
42. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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In order to escape the

prohibitions of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act,
the Secretary must also decide that the cost of community disruption

resulting from the use of alternative routes must be extraordinarily
great or that highly unusual factors exist which demand the use of the
parklands for the project. 44 The Court stressed that the protection of

parklands was of paramount importance.

Consequently, the decision

left the Secretary no room for a wide-ranging balancing of interests. 45

This decision subjected the Secretary's decision to judicial review. The
reviewing court must find that the Secretary's determination was not

"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."4 6 In essence, the court must evaluate the de-

cision to determine whether there was a clear error of judgment in its
formulation. 7
Other cases have expanded the Overton Park decision. InArlington Coalition on Transportationv. Volpe48 the Fourth Circuit held that
in determining what parkland is "significant," and thus within the
coverage of the statute, only the value of the land as a park may be

considered. Its worth as a highway is not relevant in this evaluation.49
A finding by local officials that a small municipal park was moile important as a potential highway than as a park did not deprive the park
of its "local significance" and thus its protection under the statute.5 0

The definition of what constitutes a "use" of parkland under the
statute has also been broadly interpreted by the courts. A park was
deemed to be used when a highway was planned to encircle it although

none of its land was actually taken.

1

Similarly, parkland was con-

43. Id. at411.
44. Id. at 413.
45. Id. at 411.
46. Id. at 416.
47. The Court's authority and jurisdiction to make this determination are derived
from the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). The Court decided
in Overton Park that section 706(2)(A) provided the appropriate standard against
which to evaluate the Secretary's decision. 401 U.S. at 416. Section 706(2) (A) provides: "The reviewing court shall. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be . . .arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.. . ...
" Although the Court found no requirement
that written findings of fact accompany the Secretary's decision, Department of Transportation Order 5610.1 now requires such findings whenever the Secretary approves the
use of parklands for a highway. 401 U.S. at 417.
48. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
49. Id. at 1336.
50. Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1972).
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sidered to be used when a highway was designed to follow a border of

the park. 2
The Secretary must make his determination under section 4(f)
before program approval is granted. A Department of Transportation
Order requires the Secretary to submit written findings along with his
53
decision.
Finally, the selection of projects to be included in a state's program must be made "by the appropriate local officials and the State
highway department in cooperation with each other. 5' 14 The federalaid highway statute makes these factors prerequisites for program approval. At this stage in the aid process the public has no direct access
to the federal or state agencies which will make important and sometimes irrevocable decisions.5 5
B.

Route Location Approval

After federal approval of the list of projects in the state's program has been obtained, the state must then seek route location ap-

proval. 50

The program approval authorizes preliminary engineering

and the right-of-way acquisition estimates necessary for alternative lo-

cation studies which are to follow. The state highway department then
explores the various possible locations to determine which presents
the most feasible route. In order to comply with federal requirements,
the state must prepare estimates illustrating the number of individuals,
families, and firms that would be'displaced by each suggested placement of the highway and the availability of adequate replacement housing for each alternative.5 7 This information and all supporting data

must be available at the subsequent location public hearing. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
52. Conservation Soe'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 639 (D. Vt.
1973).
53. See note 47 supra.
54. 23 U.S.C. § 105(d) (1970).
55. A FHWA regulation, 23 C.F.R. § 795 (1973), has been promulgated recently
which directs state highway departments to develop action plans "[t]o assure that adequate
consideration is given to possible social, economic, and environmental effects of proposed highway projects . . . ."
Id. These action plans, which must be approved
by the governor of the state and the FHWA regional administrator, are designed to pro.
vide specialized impact information during the early stages of highway development.
This information must be made available to the public. The action plan requirement
will be reviewed intermittently. Non-compliance with the action plan may subject the
state highway department to punitive sanctions.
56. See 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970); 23 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1973).
57. FHWA Instructional Memorandum 80-1, para. 14(b) (Dec. 10, 1970). Relocation activities at this stage of the project are described as conceptual stage activities.
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of 1970 (URA)"s requires that a state participating in the federal-aid
highway program give "satisfactory assurances" that:
(1) . . "fair and reasonable relocation" payments for moving expenses and for "replacement housing" will be provided to persons who must relocate;
(2) . . "relocation assistance programs" will be provided for
such displaced persons; and
(3) . . . "within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement
there will be available" adequate replacement housing. 59
In La Rasa Unida v. Volpe and Lathan v. Volpe, the courts held that
compliance with this segment of the federal relocation statute must occur no later than location approval. 60
Next, the state highway department must evaluate the potential
environmental impact of the proposed highway project and disseminate
its findings in the form of a draft impact statement. 6 This report must
include the specific items listed in the FHWA policy memoranda.62
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1970).
59. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1972); see 42 U.S.C. §
4630 (1970). This practice is called giving statewide assurances. FHWA Instructional
Memorandum 80-1, paras. 7(a)(1)-(3) (Dec. 10, 1970).
60. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The Ninth Circuit held in Lathan
that the congressional purposes' behind the URA required that detailed relocation assurances be prepared not later than the location stage. 455 F.2d at 1119.
61. See F-WA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 5(a) (Aug. 24,
1971). In paragraph 3(c) of that memorandum the environmental impact statement
is defined as
a written statement containing an assessment of the anticipated significant
beneficial or detrimental effects which the agency decision may have upon the
quality of the human environment for the purposes of: (1) assuring that careful attention is given to environmental matters, (2) providing a vehicle for implementing all applicable environmental requirements, and (3) to insure that
the environmental impact is taken into account in the agency decision.
The term "human environment" is broadly defined in paragraph 3(f) as, "'the aggregate
of all external conditions and influences (aesthetic, ecological, biological, cultural, social,
economic, historical, etc.) that affect the life of a human." This memorandum has been
issued by the FHWA to guide the states and division engineers in the proper execution
of national environmental policy. It draws its authority from four sources; (1) the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); (2) the Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); (3) the Historic Preservation Act of 1966 § 106, 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1970); and (4) the Clean Air Act
of 1970 § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(7) (1970). Seventeen copies of the draft impact
statement must be sent to the FHWA division engineer in the state for distribution.
FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(d) (Aug. 24, 1971).
62. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, app. E (Aug. 24, 1971).
This memorandum provides also for the exemption of "urgently needed" highway sections from the requirement of preparing the environmental impact statement. A request
for exemption by the state highway department must be approved by the FHWA, the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation, and the Council on Environmental Quality.
Id. para. 5(g).

1234

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

The FHWA has established rules to determine whether a particular
highway section must receive environmental scrutiny.08 Where a highway would (1) cause actual or anticipated opposition to its construction, or (2) significantly affect historic or conservation land, regardless
of public ownership, or (3) be classified as a major action likely to
significantly affect the quality of the human environment, draft and
final environmental statements are required. 64

Much federal-aid highway litigation at the location stage focuses
on the impact statement requirement. Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 19695 "authorizes and directs that,
to the fullest extent possible," every agency of the federal government
shall:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented. 66
63. Id. app. F. This memorandum uses the term "highway section" and not "project" to describe the length of highway subject to an environmental review. Paragraph
6 of this Memorandum states:
The highway section included in an environmental statement should be
as long as practicable to permit consideration of environmental matters on a
broad scope. Peacemealing [sic] proposed highway improvements in separate
environmental statements should be avoided. If possible, the highway section
should be of substantial length that would normally be included in a multiyear highway improvement program.
64. Id. app. F(l). In paragraph four of this appendix the description of the "negative declaration" is given. No impact statement must be submitted for highway sections
in this classification. A section not considered to be a major action and/or not significantly affecting the quality of the human environment is to receive a negative declaration. Whereas a draft environmental impact statement must undergo substantial federal
and state scrutiny, the negative declaration is exempted from this analysis. It need only
be available for public inspection at the location hearing. Id. para. 6(n). Based on
new information, a highway department or the FHWA may rescind the negative declaration and have an impact statement prepared. Id. para. 6(o). But the ultimate decision on the adequacy of the negative declaration lies in the hands of the FHWA division
engineer. Id. para. 6(n). This stands in stark contrast to the high level review every
draft environmental impact statement must undergo. Id. para. 6(d).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
66. Id.
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The importance of this statutory mandate has been emphasized
many times by the courts. In a leading NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,"7 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "NEPA, first
of all, makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every
federal agency and department.""' Furthermore the court noted that
"[T]he Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible; [t]hey must be
complied with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of
statutory authority."'6 9 Although Calvert Cliffs' concerned an AEC
project and not a federal-aid highway, the Calvert Cliffs' analysis of
70
NEPA has been widely applied by courts in highway litigation.
In almost all cases, federal-aid highway construction projects constitute "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" within the meaning and coverage of NEPA. 7 ' In
Scherr v. Volpe 2 the Seventh Circuit examined FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 3 to help it determine the relevant criteria for
finding major federal action in the construction of highways. It concluded that a major federal action included even the upgrading of an
existing highway when such construction significantly affected the environment.7 4 Moreover, the decision of administrative officials that a
particular project was not a major federal action was held subject to
75
broad judicial review.
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) required by NEPA
must be objective, inclusive, and based on extensive research. Brooks
v. Volpe 70 condemned a highway project EIS that was based on generalities and "heavy-handed self-justifications.1 77 The EIS must have
a sufficient research base and must be comprehensive enough to provide a useful record for judicial review.78 Potential air and noise pol67. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
68. Id. at 1112.
69. Id. at 1115; see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp.
749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
70. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir.
1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1972); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 102425 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp.
269, 277-79 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
72. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
73. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 (Aug. 24, 1971).
74. 466 F.2d at 1032-33.
75. Id. at 1032.
76. 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
77. Id. at 278.
78. Id. at 277.
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lution from a new highway should also be considered in the EIS.'1
Two of the most contested aspects of the NEPA section 102(2)(c)
requirements concern (1) the extent of federal participation necessary
in the initial drafting of the EIS and (2) the determination of whether
individual impact statements can cover relatively small segments of
highway, thus avoiding regional environmental considerations.
As to the participation question, courts have generally required
federal agencies to take an active role in the EIS process in projects
under their supervision. 80 In Conservation Society v. Secretary of
Transportations ' the court held that the Federal Highway Authority
(FHWA) had abdicated its responsibility under NEPA by substituting
the EIS of the Vermont Highway Department for its own.8 2 The court
stated that both NEPA and Memorandum 90-1 were violated by
FHWA reliance on the state EIS, and it concluded that an EIS drawn
by a state highway department will certainly be self-serving."3 The
FHWA could not adequately perform its decisionmaking role under
NEPA without actually participating in the researching and drafting
of the EIS. State participation in EIS drafting will be allowed as long
as there is no state dominance of the procedure.
Other cases have implied that less federal participation is required.84 In Fair v. Volpes" the court found FHWA participation in a
research study, presumably preliminary to the actual drafting of the
EIS, sufficient to satisfy the NEPA requirements. In fact, for the vast
79. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1334 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
80. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412,
420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). The FPC regulations requiring applicants seeking power plant licenses to prepare environmental impact statements were
invalidated as improper delegations of agency power. The court accused the FPC of
abandoning its responsibilities under NEPA and required the FPC staff to draw up the
final impact statement without outside assistance. Id. at 420, 422.
81. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
82. Id. at 632.
83. Id. at 631. At least one court has gone farther than the Conservation Society
decision. In Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972),
the court viewed FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 as an improper delegation of responsibilites mandated by NEPA and consequently struck down the memorandum. The court reasoned that a department could not provide an impartial analysis
of a project's impact. Contra, Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp.
286 (D. Kan. 1973); National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123
(D. Mont. 1972). These two decisions uphold the memorandum as a reasonable delegation of power.
84. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont.
1972); Iowa Citizens For Environmental Quality v. Volpe, 4 Env. Rep. Cases 1755
(S.D. Iowa 1972).
85. 5 Env. Rep. Cases 1205, 1207-08 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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majority of highway projects, state highway departments alone have
drafted the impact statements.
The piecemealing question goes to the heart of the NEPA mandate. The ability of the NEPA section 102(2)(c) statement to provide a meaningful environmental impact analysis of a chosen highway
section and its alternatives is significantly impaired when highway officials are permitted to draft individual impact statements for many
small segments of a large highway project.8 6 Critical examinations of
the environmental effect of the placement of a roadway must occur on
a larger geographic scale to give full meaning to the spirit and purpose
of NEPA.
In a recent case, Conservation Society v. Secretary of Transportation, 7 the United States District Court for the District of Vermont
reached the above conclusion. The court required the FHWA to
draft and consider an EIS for the entire 1-7 corridor, transversing three
states, before construction could begin on the contested Bennington to
Manchester segment of the road. a8 Defendants had only prepared
statements on an individual basis for those segments of 1-7 to be constructed in the near future. The obvious problem with this approach
is that approval of subsequently constructed highway segments often
becomes obligatory when the EIS for those projects is drafted and considered. Meaningful evaluation of environmental consequences becomes moot since the failure to build the proposed segment would render the previously constructed roadway inefficient or useless.8 9 The
more segments of the highway completed, the more this becomes apparent. 0
The Conservation Society decision is virtually unique in this area.
Most NEPA cases have not discussed the piecemealing question, and it
can be surmised that few courts in the past would have adopted the
ConservationSociety rationale had the question arisen.
86. See generally Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soe'y
v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1022-24 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 933 (1972); Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-09 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
87. 362F:Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
88. Id. at 638.
89.

Id. at 637.

90. The piecemealing problem exists as to other statutory requirements of the federal-aid highway procedure. For example, similar arguments can be made as to the
scope of the public hearings required under 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970) and FHWA
Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8 (Jan. 14, 1969). As with impact statements,
the practice has been to hold public hearings for relatively short segments of proposed
highways rather than for the entire highway as a complete entity.
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In Movement Against Destructionv. Volpe, 91 another recent case,
the court held that NEPA did not require the preparation of an EIS for
the entire network of constructed and proposed federal-aid highways
in the Baltimore area.92 This holding was based upon the finding that
the area-wide road network involved several distinct highways and that
Department of Transportation decisions had been made for individual
highway projects rather than for the entire systemf 3 The court stated,
however, that impact statements prepared for those individual projects
should reflect the projects' environmental impact in relation to the' en94
tire configuration.
The Movement Against Destruction case does not go as far as
Conservation Society and does not determine what proportion of a single highway corridor must be considered in any one environmental impaot statement. The effectiveness of NEPA in the highway construction area will be determined in part by the position that the courts will
adopt on the piecemealing question in future cases. 9 However, an
important portion of FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1
directs that environmental impact statements must be prepared for
"highway sections" and not for "projects."' 6 This administrative ruling would seemingly bar segmented environmental analysis of highways and guide judicial evaluation of future piecemealing efforts.
The draft impact statement, as written in the location approval
stage, is then widely distributed to federal, state, and local agencies
for review and comment. Finally the draft impact statement is made
available for public inspection.97 But public comment is sought only
after the decision to build a highway has been made and after federal
and state agency review has occurred. Citizens cannot participate in
the determination of whether a highway or another mode of transportation is best suited to the needs of the area. Furthermore, the reviewing agencies pass on the impact of the project without first obtaining
91. 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.Md. 1973).
92. Id. at 1402.
93. Id. at 1381.
94. Id. at 1385.
95. For a discussion of the question of substantive review of highways under
NEPA see authorities cited in note 176 and accompanying text infra.
96. See note 63 supra.
97. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(c) (Aug. 24, 1971)
requires that the draft environmental impact statement be made available to the public
no later than the first required notice of the location public hearing (30 to 40 days,
see FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8, paras. 7-8 (Jan. 14, 1969)), or notice of the opportunity to request a public hearing.
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public comments. In this way the public is excluded from the highway
planning process.
At the location stage the state must also contact any railroad or
utility in the path of a proposed highway site to discuss future relocation of facilities. Federal reimbursement funds are available for ninety
percent of this costf 8
Federal statutes now require that a location or corridor public
hearing be held 9 and FHWA has issued detailed regulations directing
the conduct of both the corridor and design public hearings.10 0 State
highway departments may satisfy this requirement either by holding a
hearing or by publicizing the opportunity to request one. Nearly all
federal highway construction projects necessitate operation of this section of the federal transportation law. Strict notice requirements are
imposed upon the highway departments to insure public awareness of
the project.' 0 1 At the location hearing, the relocation assistance program must be discussed; 10 2 information about alternative highway locations must be made available; 0 3 the draft must be explained; 0 4 and
responsible state highway officials must be present to conduct the
98. 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970).
99. Id. § 128. See also Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d
693, 701 (2d Cir. 1972); D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1242
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
100. 23 C.F.R. H§ 790.3(a)-(b) (1973). Subsection (a) defines the corridor public
hearing as a hearing that,
(1) Is held before the route location is approved and before the State highway
department is committed to a specific proposal, except as provided in §
790.5(g).
(2) Is held to ensure that an opportunity is afforded for effective participation
by interested persons in the process of determining the need for, and the location of, a Federal-aid highway; and
(3) Provides a public forum that affords a full opportunity for presenting
views on each of the proposed alternative highway locations and the social,
economic, and environmental effects of those alternative locations.
101. Id. § 790.7(a). Subsection (a) (2) further requires that notice of the hearing
be mailed to "appropriate news media, the State's resource, recreation, and planning
agencies, and appropriate representatives of the Departments of Interior and Housing
and Urban Development." Copies are also to be sent "to other Federal agencies, and
local public officials, public advisory groups and agencies who have requested notice of
hearing and other groups or agencies who, by nature of their function, interest, or responsibility the highway department knows or believes might be interested in or affected
by the proposal." This subsection also directs the highway department to create a list
of such interested parties to which notice could be sent automatically. Expenses incurred by the public hearing may be reimbursed by the federal government. Id. §
790.11.
102. Id. § 790.7(b)(7). See also Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1340 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
103. 23 C.F.R. § 790.7(b)(3) (1973).
104. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(e) (Aug. 24, 1971).
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Citizen participation and response

must be reflected in the study reports submitted by the state to the
FHWA. In this way local viewpoints are brought to the attention of
federal decisionmakers.

°6

Additionally, in Keith v. Volpe,10 7 the court

held that the potential air and noise pollution impact of the proposed
highway must be considered at the location hearing. The court in
Arlington Coalition on Transportationv. Volpe 0 8 ruled that in certain

cases proposed area-wide rapid transit systems should be discussed at
the corridor hearing and that the projected highway construction be

evaluated in light of mass transit possibilities. 0 9 These decisions reflect the fact that judges are demanding that public hearings consider a
wide range of subjects in order to present a realistic picture of available
alternatives.

Theoretically, public comment and any agency reaction received
must be incorporated into a revision of the location selection and environmental analysis. After making its route selection, the state must
formally request location approval, certify that public location hearings have been held, deliver public hearing transcripts and certificates

and submit a thorough study report concerning -the highway section.'
A recent FHWA regulation has -added the requirement that a detailed
survey of the noise impact of the various proposed route locations be
included in the location study report"' and federal-aid highways must
now conform to standards which limit noise levels." ' These docu-

ments must accompany the state's request for location approval that
105. 23 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) (4) (1973).
106. Id. § 790.8(b) (2) (ii). Federal Highway Administrator F.C. Turner has admitted that in 15% of all projects, a major change resulted from the public hearing;
Red Tape 86.
107. 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1339 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
108. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
109. Id. at 1337.
110. 23 C.F.R. §§ 790.9(e)(1)(i)-(iv) (1973). Subsection (b) provides a detailed
framework for the preparation of the study report. See also note 63 supra.
111. 23 C.F.R. § 772.7(b)(3) (1973). The purpose of the newly promulgated regulation is:
To provide noise standards and procedures for use by State highway agencies and the Federal Highway Administrator (FHWA) in the planning and
design of highways approved pursuant to title 23, United States Code, and to
assure that measures are taken in the overall public interest to achieve highway
noise levels that are compatible with different land uses, with due consideration
also given to other social, economic and environmental effects.
Id. § 772.1.
112. Id. § 772.6(a). Section 772.3(b) adds that a state may be exempted from
complying with the noise standards for a particular project if it can show that any one
of three broadly defined conditions exists. It is recommended in section 772.7(b)(8)
that any requests for exceptions should be identified and included in the location study
report. Exceptions apparently are available only through the design approval stage.
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is transmitted to the local division engineer. Public notices must be
given of the selection. 113 Next, the final EIS, embodying any modification incurred during the period of review and comment, must be forwarded to the Regional Federal Highway Administrator for high level
approval. 14 Location approval may not be granted by the division
engineer until the regional official accepts the final impact statement
and the Office of Environment and Urban Systems of -the Department
of Transportation concurs with that action." 5 In addition, the public
and tfhe Council on Environmental Quality must be given thirty days
to inspect the final impact statement."16 When all of these prerequisites have been fulfilled, the division engineer acts upon the state's
application. If the selected location is acceptable to the division engineer, the state highway department will then seek design approval
for the roadway.
C. Design Approval
Upon granting location approval, the federal division engineer
authorizes the commencement of design engineering for the project
and the appraisal of right-of-way property. In some instances, full or
partial right-of-way condemnation may be permitted prior to the design public hearing."17 A period of design study must follow in which
the specifio location and the major design features are determined.
Concurrently, a final relocation plan for displaced residents is prepared.
As with location approval, design selection requires that an opportunity for a public hearing be given to insure citizen participation in
the decisionmaking process."" The public is provided adequate notice of the hearing, and subsequently the hearings are conducted under
established guidelines." 9 The purpose of this hearing is to expose the
113. Id. § 790.10.
114. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(j) (Aug. 24, 1971).
Actually the regional office then sends the final EIS to the FHWA's Office of Environmental Policy. This national office transmits the document to the Office of Environment and Urban Systems of the Department of Transportation for further concurrence
and then finally to the Council on Environmental Quality for recording. Id. para. 6(k).
115. Id. para. 6(k).
116. Id. para. 6(k)(2)(b).
117. The general rule concerning right-of-way acquisition is that it cannot take
place until after the design public hearing. 23 C.F.R. § 790.9(f) (1973) provides for
taking prior to the hearing in the unusual circumstances set forth in section 790.2(c).
118. Id.H8 790.3(b)(1)-(3).
119. Id. § 790.7. Subsection (a) (4) requires that the notice announcing the design
hearing must indicate "that tentative schedules for right-of-way acquisition and construction will be discussed [at the meeting]."
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specific highway location and design features to public scrutiny.1 20
Taking into account the comments made at the public design hearing,
the state selects a final design proposal for submission to the FHWA
division office. Accompanying this proposal is a formal request for
design approval, a certification of hearings, a transcript of that proceeding and a thorough design study report including an updated
noise analysis.1 21 At this time FHWA regulations require that the
chosen design configuration or a narrative description be published in
a newspaper to assure its fullest public exposure.1 22 A state will often
include written project assurances on relocation assistance and its final
relocation plan with its request for
design approval so that right-of-way
1 23
acquisition may begin promptly.
Upon obtaining design approval, the state must prepare a rightof-way acquisition plan for review by the division engineer. Once this
is granted, real property may be taken for the project with relocation
assistance made available to the relocatees. If any utility facilities or
railroad property lies in the path of the selected highway right-of-way,
provision must be made for their relocation and clearance of the future
roadbed. The state highway department must reach a relocation agreement with the obstructing utility and submit a written copy to the
FHWA division engineer for authorization to proceed.124 Federal
funds may be used to partially reimburse states for the cost of utility
relocation.' 2 5 With this federal approval, actual railroad and utility
relocation may commence.
As the time of actual highway construction approaches, the state
120. No longer is highway design considered merely a technical question removed
from public interest and scrutiny. F.C. Turner testified to the nature of popular concern over design decisions. He stated:
Mhey have a large number of points of interest in connection with the
design. Basically, is it going to be elevated or depressed? If it is elevated,
is it going to be on fill or is it going to be on structure? Am I going to be
able to get across it to my neighbors on the other side here? How far do
I have to go to get around? How far will the children have to go to get across
to play with their friends on the other side? Will there be a pedestrian crossing, and thousands of other questions that relate to the design?
Red Tape 85-86.
121. 23 C.F.R. § 772.7(b)(4) (1973).
122. Id. § 790.10.
123. FHWA Instructional Memorandum 80-1-71, paras. 15(a)-(b) (Oct. 11, 1972).
124. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 30-4, paras. 7(c), 7(o) (1) (Dec.
10, 1970). The agreement must be supported by "plans, specifications where required,
and estimates of the work agreed upon, which shall be sufficiently informative and complete to provide the State and division engineer with a clear showing of work required
in accordance with paragraphs 7(h) and (i) of this memorandum." Id. para. 7(b).
125. Id. para. 3.
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must secure a minimum wage rate determination for the United States
Department of Labor.' 2 6 This requirement was imposed by the DavisBacon Act'2 7 to insure that workers on federally assisted highway building projects received wages comparable to those earned in similar construction in the immediate locality. Once minimum wage levels are
determined, they "shall be set out in each project advertisement for
bids and in each bid proposal form and shall be made a part of the
contract covering the project."'"" The establishment of the prevailing
wage rate is often computed on an area-wide basis in advance of any
particular highway project.
D.

Plans,Specification andEstimate Approval

Next, the state highway department must prepare detailed construction plans, job specifications, and cost estimates (PS&E) relating
to the federal-aid project.'2 9 Approval of the PS&E officially commits
the federal funding.' 30 This state presentation allows specific evaluation by the division engineer of the details underlying the project. Once
more, the granting of federal approval is conditioned upon compliance
with several statutory, regulatory, and memoranda requirements. First,
it must be shown that local road officials were consulted by the state
highway department for the cooperative preparation of the PS&E.' 31
Secondly, items included in the project estimates for construction engineering may not exceed ten percent of the total cost.'8 2 Thirdly, the
PS&E must provide a facility:
(1) that will adequately meet the existing and probable future
traffic needs and conditions in a manner conducive to safety, durability, and economy of maintenance; (2) that will be designed and
constructed in accordance with standards best suited to accomplish
126. 23 U.S.C. § 113 (1970). A 1968 amendment extended this coverage to all
federal-aid highways and not solely to the Interstate System.
127. 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1970). 23 C.F.R. § 1.24 (1973) also deals with the
subject of labor employed on highway projects. Section 1.24(a) forbids the use of convict labor on any project.
128. 23 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1970).
129. Id. § 106(a).
130. Id. Peterson and Kennan assert that PS&E approval is often a multi-staged,
informal procedure hardly resembling the statutory framework. Peterson & Kennan, supra note 24. Administratively created "authorization to proceed with work" serves to
delay the point of federal contractual obligation and is found in 23 C.F.R. § 1.12
(1973).
131. 23 U.S.C. § 106(b).
132. Id. § 106(c). This appears to be an attempt to keep down preliminary nonconstruction costs. Section 106(d) also allows the FHWA to require, at its discretion,
that the PS&E "be accompanied by a value engineering or other cost reduction analysis."
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the foregoing objectives and to conform to the particular needs of

133
each locality.

In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe' 34 the court held
that the Secretary's approval must be based on sufficient evidence and
adequate research and, furthermore, that this determination should also
include an investigation of possible air pollution hazards. 35 Fourthly,
the geometric and construction standards used by the state in designing
projects on the interstate system must be determined adequate for
carrying the expected traffic load over a twenty-year period.' 38 Finally, the state must certify that it has complied with all hearing requirements. 13 7 When the state highway department applies for PS&E approval, it also must request an authorization to proceed on projects entailing actual construction work. 33 This latter obligation has been administratively imposed and does not appear in any federal statute. At
this point solicitation of bids is imminent.
Before the advertisement for construction bids can occur, the federal requirements for relocating displaced persons and firms must be
fulfilled. The division engineer has an obligation t o verify the fact
that "adequate replacement housing is in place and has been made
available to relocatees .

*..",9

prior to his authorization for reimburs-

able construction. This verification shall be accomplished by "spot
check field reviews by the division engineer to the depth necessary to
provide sufficient evidence that there has been full compliance with
the order.' 140 The spot check mechanism is the culmination of the
federal effort to assist those who unfortunately are dislocated by federally sponsored programs.
E. ConstructionApproval
When the PS&E approval, authorization to proceed, and verification of relocation are received, the state may advertise for and receive
133. Id. § 109(a). Section 106(a) specifically denominates the standards established in section 109 as a guide for the approval of PS&E's.
134. 459 F.2d 1231, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
135. Id. at 1242.
136. 23 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1970). Section 109 indicates that PS&E approval is to
be predicated upon additional requirements. Subsection (g) calls for the promulgation
of soil erosion standards while subsections (i) and (j) mandate noise level and air quality consideration.
137. Id. §§ 128(a)-(b).
138. 23 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1973).
139. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-1-71, para. 16(a)(1) (Oct. 11,
1972). This memorandum defines adequate and available replacement housing. Id.
paras. 16(b)-(c).
140. Id. para. 16(d).
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competitive bids. It will recommend award of the construction contract or rejection of bids to the division engineer who must then concur
in the judgment. Ordinarily bids are approved without significant
scrutiny. When the contract is approved by the federal agent, it will
be returned to the state for administration. Thereafter, construction
will take place under the periodic supervision of the division engineer.
F.

Other Statutory Prerequisites

Several other statutes bear upon federal-aid highway construction.
Although they are not formal prerequisites for the approval of any particular stage, they must be satisfied to comply with federal law. In
this sense they might be of interest to groups challenging a federal-aid
highway. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 18991'1 requires that a permit
to be obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers for all dredge and
fill operations in navigable waters. Where a request is made for a permit for the construction of a dike or causeway, the Corps must secure
the consent of Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transportation before issuing the permit. When a permit was issued for a dike
and causeway for 'the Hudson River Expressway, the Second. Circuit in
Citizens Comnittee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe 4 ' held that the
Corps had breached a non-discretionary duty by failing to secure the
consent and approval before acting.' 43
The same federal statute' 4 4 requires a permit to construct a bridge
over navigable waters. This permit must be obtained from the Coast
Guard Commandant. According to the court in Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,145 no approval for federal funding
can be granted until the bridge permit is acquired.
The Historic Preservation Act' 4 requires that elaborate safeguards
be undertaken to protect important historical areas and structures from
unnecessary destruction or degradation. It has been held that these
requirements must be complied with by highway construction officials
to the fullest extent where the highway will impinge upon the protected
subjects. 47 It is expected that this new statute will serve as a basis for
much highway litigation in the future.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

33 U.S.C. §§ 401-26 (1970).
425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 100.
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
472 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1972).
16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HIGHWAY
LITIGATION-STANDING

Standing should no longer present a barrier to environmental litigation in general and highway litigation in particular. The Supreme
Court has defined and clarified the criteria for standing in most environmental suits in two recent decisions, Sierra Club v. Morton1 4 s and
14
United States v. SCRAP.
In Sierra Club,"50 the Court reaffirmed earlier decisions which
held that the alleged injury or potential injury necessary to obtain
standing "may. reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as
well as economic values."' 5 ' The Court added the requirement that
such injury must directly affect the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must allege that the injury is "individualized" to them and that they are adversely affected by such injury.' 52 It is insufficient that plaintiffs have
"a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest
and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem . . . .153 Plaintiffs must show they have a "direct stake in the
outcome" of the litigation.'
Nevertheless, the Court also stated that an organization, such
as the Sierra Club, could sue on behalf of its injured members where
the ,harn met the Court's criteria.' 55 Furthermore, once standing is
established by the above test, the plaintiff organization "may assert the
interests of the general public in support of [its] claims for equitable
relief."' 5 6 The fact that the injury in question is widely shared does
not defeat standing as long as plaintiffs themselves are in fact injured.
The Court in Sierra Club indicated that standing was to be denied
the club for its failure to allege in its complaint that its members actually used the Mineral King Recreation Area and that they "would
148. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
149. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (1972).
150. This case concerned the Sierra Club's attack on proposed plans to allow Walt
Disney Enterprises to build a large ski resort in the Mineral King Recreation Area in
California. Incidentally, this project would involve a long road through the Sequoia National Forest, though it is questionable whether such road would qualify as a federalaid highway.
151. 405 U.S. at 738, citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
152. 405 U.S. at 736.
153. Id. at 739.
154. Id. at 740.
155. Id. at 739.
156. Id. at 740 & n.15.
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be affected in any of their activities or pasttimes by the Disney development. ' 1 57 Such allegations would have been sufficient to satisfy the
s
Court's test."r
The Court further clarified its standing test in United States v.
SCRAP.1 , 9 Plaintiffs had attacked the Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to grant temporarily an overall freight rate increase to
all of the nation's railroads. Plaintiffs alleged that the rate hike
would cause increased use of non-recyclable goods, thus causing accelerated consumption of natural resources, some taken from the Washington, D.C. area where plaintiffs resided. This in turn would cause
increased amounts of refuse to be disposed of in the Washington area
parks used by the plaintiffs. The Court held that plaintiffs had by
these allegations satisfied the standing requirements. 160 U'nlike the
Sierra Club, plaintiffs claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their "use and en' 6
joyment of the natural resources of the Washington area.' 1
While suggesting that the nature of the alleged wrong was such
that virtually every citizen of the nation might have standing to sue,
the Court re-emphasized that "standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. 162 As long as plaintiffs can
demonstrate the requisite injury, standing will be found by the courts.
The SCRAP decision's most important contribution to standing
questions in environmental litigation is its holding that the fact that
the alleged wrong and the alleged injury are connected by a "more attenuated line of causation" than in cases such as Sierra Club is immaterial as long as the connection exists and harm is in fact caused to the
plaintiffs.' 63 Furthermore, once the injury is alleged, the degree or
64
quantity of the injury is also immaterial.1
Both Sierra Club and SCRAP were suits brought to review federal
administrative actions under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 6 5 One can argue that the standing criteria established in
157. Id. at 735.
158. Id. at 736. The Court stated it would be willing to allow the Sierra Club to
amend its complaint. Id. at 736 n.8. See also West Virginia Highlands Conservancy
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
159. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
160. Id. at 685, 689-90.
161. Id. at 686.
162. Id. at 687.
163. Id. at 688-89.
164. Id. at 689 n.14.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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these decisions are equally applicable to all environmental suits. 1'0 In
any event, these holdings are certainly available to establish the standing of highway litigants and to enable the review of the federal-aid
highway decision process as effected by the Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Authority.

All facets of federal-aid

highway construction must relate back to one or more federal administrative decisions.
ighway litigation plaintiffs should be chosen to include residents
of the area through which a planned highway is to pass. It is not necessary that these plaintiffs be actually displaced by the highway.

Resi-

dents of communities that will be affected by the highway should be
sufficient. Civic groups representing members of these communities also
will have standing. Individuals and groups whose members use park-

lands to be affected by a highway will, of course, have standing. The
injuries to be alleged can include economic, aesthetic, social, and rec-

reational injuries. To be completely safe from even the most conservative of judges, a landowner who is apt to lose part of his land to the

highway should be joined as a party plaintiff. Adequate fore-thought
should, in light of the two above-cited cases, avoid all standing diffi7
culties. 1
IV.

PLAINTIFF STRATEGIES FOR HIGHWAY LITIGATION

The decisions in federal-aid highway cases to date have been generally in favor of the plaintiffs. While several of these decisions have
established important points of law, many of the anti-highway victories
166. See generally Comment, Supreme Court Decides the Mineral King Case:
Sierra Club v. Morton, 2 ENv. L. REP. 10034 (1972); Comment, More on Standing:
The Supreme Court's Last Word, The Tenth Circuit's Last Stand, 3 ENV. L. REP. 10096
(1973). However, it must be remembered that, as a matter independent of the standing
question, jurisdictional amount requirements must be satisfied when applicable. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1970). Jurisdictional amount was not a matter of controversy in
either Sierra Club or the SCRAP cases since both were brought under a special jurisdictional statute which does not require a jurisdictional amount. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06
(1970). For a recent analysis of the jurisdictional amount requirements in a water pollution damage suit see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). It should
be kept in mind, however, that special jurisdictional statutes will be available for most
federal-aid highway litigation.
167. Environmental plaintiffs should also remain aware of laches problems; see Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir. 1972); Lathan
v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324,
1341 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831, 841 (D. Mass. 1971). Problems of sovereign immunity as to state party defendants also arise; see Citizens Comm.
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Elliot v. Volpe, supra
at 834.
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have proved illusory. More often than not, the preliminary injunctions
granted against state and federal agencies were later dissolved when the
administrative officials substantially complied with the procedural reIt has been difquirements of the relevant statutes and regulations.'
ficult, in even the most recent cases, to achieve any sort of substantive
review. While the courts have agreed with plaintiffs that the requirements of the various federal statutes and regulations must be met in
precise detail, most of the highways in the cases discussed have been or
will be completed in the future. Litigation may have slightly altered
their location or added certain engineering or environmental safeguards
to their design, but the highways will nonetheless be completed. 16 9
However, anti-highway litigants may be successful in future cases.
This will be the result of two factors. First, current decisions indicate
that broader procedural and substantive review may soon become possible. Secondly, litigants in future cases will be able to attack highway
construction much earlier in the federal-aid process-before substantial investment of resources forecloses meaningful review.
As to the first development, the most successful judicial attacks at
the present have been those directed against the taking of parklands
under section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.170 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,"" the only United States
Supreme Court decision in the highway area, strictly construed the
statute to impose an ascertainable and enforceable duty on the Secretary of Transportation to regulate the taking of parklands under prescribed standards.' 72 The requirements of 4(f) are substantive as well
as procedural and the actions of the Secretary can be reviewed against
a clear congressional mandate. This is the rare exception in past highway litigation since the plaintiffs were able to avail themselves of a
statute, which combines strict procedural mandates with meaningful
substantive requirements. However, most proposed highways do not
cross extensive parklands.
Otherwise, plaintiffs have had to concentrate on demanding absolute compliance with the terms of the several federal statutes regulating highway construction. This has been, at least, an important delaying and harassing tactic and will continue to remain so. The NEPA
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Red Tape 64-65.
Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Id.at 411-16.
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EIS' 73 and the section 128'1 4 public hearings demand extensive research and thorough drafting and preparation on the part of federal
and state officials. The fact that these officials are forced by litigation
to consider the immensity of the task before them may cause them to
carefully weigh public opinion before authorizing federal-aid highways.
The Rivers and Harbors Act, 175 with its requirement of congressional
consent, and the Relocation Statute, requiring major state efforts, also
act as highway deterrents in a similar manner.
Nevertheless, until recently most courts had considered their job
finished when the procedural requirements were met. The vast quantities of environmental, social, and economic data provided by impact
statements and public hearings were found necessary for informed decision-making by highway officials but were not weighed by the court
in an ultimate determination of the merits of the project.
There is, however, some recent authority to the effect that section
101 of NEPA provides substantive rights and that courts may evaluate
administrative decisions based on a project EIS to determine if the benefits of a particular project may reasonably be said to outweigh its
costs. 176 If not, the project could be permanently enjoined. Although
these decisions do not involve highway projects, their reasoning may
be applied to this area, especially as the secondary effects of highway
construction become understood. It is uncertain whether NEPA will
eventually secure substantive rights to highway plaintiffs. However,
it is becoming increasingly clear that NEPA will demand a broader
procedural perspective from highway officals. As previously noted,
the Conservation Society177 decision required an EIS for an entire highway corridor rather than for a small segment as had previously been
the practice. The court suggested that the entire federal-aid highway
scheme might be imcompatible with the NEPA mandate since the
monies in the highway trust funds can be expended only for highways..'
This clashes directly with the NEPA requirement that all alternatives to the construction of the highway, including mass transportation and the nonconstruction of the highway, be evaluated.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970).
174. 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970).
175. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-26 (1970).
176. See Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297-301 (8th Cir. 1972);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
177. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
178. Id. at 637.
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Consideration of a highway as a whole, as discussed previously,. 79
gives highway officials a more meaningful opportunity to evaluate the
impact of and need for a given highway. Similar anti-piecemealing
requirements have been imposed on determinations under section 4(f),
and may be applied to the public hearing requirements. 80 Plaintiffs
should stress these broadened procedural requirements in their cases.
Beyond causing delay and increased effort on the part of defendants,
this strategy may produce vast amounts of data which can be used in
support of substantive arguments.' 8 '
The success of future highway litigation will depend, secondly, on
how early in the highway development process plaintiffs begin their
attack. Many of the highways scrutinized in past cases had undergone
extensive planning and occasionally some construction before a lawsuit
was brought. This was often unavoidable since the planning and appropriations for these highways were concluded prior to the passage
of several statutes upon which plaintiff had relied. While on-going
project questions were often resolved in plaintiffs' favor,'
plaintiffs
nevertheless had lacked the statutory tools to bring appropriate litigation at an early time. As stressed in the previous discussion, of NEPA
requirements, once substantial resources have been invested in any
highway project, courts are hesitant to take any action which might ultimately render these expenditures wasted or useless. Indeed, there
has been a widespread fear among environmental litigants that strict
judicial enforcement of NEPA against on-going projects might produce
a congressional backlash that would support amendments substantially
weakening NEPA's requirements or curtailing judicial review.
Future highway litigants should, however, be able to avoid this
pitfall. By bringing suit as soon as possible after location approval is
granted, plaintiffs will be in a position to demand of any new highway
project (1) extensive research into the environmental, social, and economic impact of the proposed highway, (2) compliance with all applicable federal statutes and regulations, (3) ,the broad investigation
179. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
180. See Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soe'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1022 (5th Cir. 1971).
181. A delay caused by enforced procedural compliance could disturb the projected
expenditure of available federal funds, thus making possible lawsuits a potent threat.
182. The questions of the application of new legislation to on-going highway projects begun before the effective dates of the new statutes are discussed in the following
cases: Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972);
Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania
Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); Elliot v. Volpe, 328
F. Supp. 831 (D.Mass. 1971).

